Plaintiff, a white police officer, sued defendant police department for harassment and hostile work environment arising from offensive remarks and behavior directed at an African American colleague, retaliation for the officer's reports of the misconduct, and failure to investigate his harassment and retaliation claims. The Los Angeles County Superior Court, California, granted the department's motion for summary judgment. The officer appealed.
The court concluded that the officer did not establish a material factual dispute as to whether the department's conduct toward San Bernardino ADA attorney him was in retaliation for his reports of racism in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act. The officer did not offer either direct or circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact might infer that the department's consistent criticisms of his performance over the entire tenure of his career were pretextual. The officer also did not establish a material factual dispute as to his claim of harassment or of a hostile work environment. A substantial question existed whether the officer had standing to bring a hostile environment claim. But, putting aside questions of standing, the officer could not prevail on his hostile environment claim because he did not produce evidence that he was subjected to harassing comments or conduct because of his association with or advocacy on behalf of African-Americans. There was no evidence that the complained-of conduct affected his psychological well-being. The officer also did not establish a material factual dispute as to his claim of failure to investigate harassment and retaliation.
The judgment was affirmed.
Plaintiff tenant appealed a judgment and a postjudgment order from the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which granted defendant landlord's motion for nonsuit of the tenant's action alleging breach of contract and related claims arising from the landlord's termination of a commercial lease. The trial court's award of costs to the landlord included expert witness fees pursuant to a lease provision.
The lease required substantial investment by the landlord to build a new shopping center, while the tenant had few obligations until the lease began. The parties agreed that unless the lease began by a specified date, either party would have the right to terminate for any reason. The landlord was unable to obtain the necessary approvals for a traffic signal, and the shopping center was never built. The landlord exercised its right to terminate. The court noted that because the contract was integrated, Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, precluded the use of extrinsic evidence such as drafts of the lease. The clear language of the lease, interpreted in accordance with Civ. Code, §§ 1636, 1638, 1641, gave both parties the absolute right to terminate. Because the mutual termination provision was conditioned on notice, it did not result in an illusory agreement. The expert witness fees awarded by the trial court were allowable as costs under Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(1), without any requirement of specially pleading and proving such costs at trial because the lease contract specifically provided that expert fees were recoverable costs.
The court affirmed the judgment and affirmed the postjudgment order.
